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Abstract 
This paper examines whether patents increase the geographic reach of the market for ideas. By employing 
a dataset of 25,127 US patents traded between US located firms, we find that patents sold during 
application phase are less likely to be traded outside the seller‟s state than patents that have been issued. 
To tackle the endogeneity issues we employ coarsened exact matching techniques. We find that patent 
grant increases the likelihood of a patent to be traded across boundaries of the state. This evidence is 
stronger for patents originating from the less innovative US states.  
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1. Introduction 
Innovative activity is at the heart of economic growth and the knowledge-based economy. A key 
driver of innovative activity is the exchange of ideas (Audretsch and Feldman 1996). Scholars 
have shown that knowledge flows increase the speed of innovative activity and subsequently the 
rate of economic growth (Grossman and Helpman 1991; Coe and Helpman 1995). As a result, a 
great deal of attention has been paid to channels that can embody knowledge flows; namely, 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), trade of physical goods, inventor mobility and patent 
citations.
1 
Recently, the market for patents has received considerable attention as a mechanism 
through which ideas are exchanged and, therefore, a conduit of knowledge flows. As Oulette 
(2012) shows, researchers receive information from studying patent documents in addition to 
scientific papers, while Bessen (2005) argues that the patent system should operate as a means 
for the diffusion of technical information disclosed in inventions.  
Geographic distance has been recognized as one of the most important obstacles for all 
the aforementioned channels of knowledge diffusion, including patent transactions.
2
 Burhop and 
Wolf (2013) found that geographic distance mitigates patent transactions. Drivas and 
Economidou (2014) came to similar conclusions as regards to patent citations and patent trade. 
Given the significant role of patents in technology transfer and the importance of geographic 
distance as a mitigating factor, a key question that emerges is to what extent patents weaken the 
localization of technology transfer. 
In this paper we investigate whether patent applications are less likely to be sold outside 
the state compared to issued patents. Our focus, therefore, lies on the patent grant, the event in 
which a patent application is awarded a patent, and on whether it increases the likelihood of a 
patent to be sold outside a state. 
We utilize the recently compiled dataset by the Office of Chief Economist at the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). From this dataset we isolate a large sample of 
                                                             
1Branstetter (2006) tested and verified that FDI embodies knowledge flows between Japanese and US firms. Keller 
(2002) found that accessible R&D from other industries through trade increases the own industry‟s productivity. 
Kim and Marscke (2005) showed that hiring high skilled workers increases the knowledge stock resulting in larger 
innovation output for a given firm. Finally, in the seminal paper Jaffe et al (1993) approximated knowledge flows 
via patent citations; the large literature stemming from this study has shown that citations approximate knowledge 
flows with a significant effect on production of innovation (for a recent review consult Autant-Bernard et al 2013). 
2 For instance Peri (2005) found significant negative effects of distance in the reach of patent citations.  For the large 
literature of the negative effect on distance in trade see Disdier and Head (2008).  
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patents that were traded between US located firms. We compare whether patents traded before 
patent grant (i.e. during the application phase) are less likely to be sold outside the state than 
patents traded after patent grant. There is however an inherent endogeneity problem. Patent 
applications could simply be traded within state borders because they are introduced for a short 
period of time and, therefore, known only locally. That is, the patent grant could be merely 
confounded with an aging effect and it could mistakenly be interpreted as the cause of the reach 
of technology transfer.  
To tackle this endogeneity issue we perform a coarsened exact matching of patents traded 
based on the lag of sale since filing date. By matching patents on this lag, we avoid endogeneity 
issues associated with the age of the patent application or patent. We also match patents based on 
their citations and the state‟s patent profile to capture patent quality, and the market opportunity 
for the patent. We follow the procedure proposed by Iacus et al (2012) to match patents based on 
these characteristics. 
Results show that patents originating from similar states in terms of patenting profile with 
similar trade lags and patent citations are more likely to be traded outside the state compared to 
patent applications. This indicates that patent grant plays a role in the reach of the market for 
ideas. Furthermore, we find that the patent grant effect varies across technology fields. More 
specifically, patent grant seems to increase the reach of the sale in Electronics and Mechanicals 
while it has a modest effect in Computers and Pharmaceuticals. Finally, for patents that originate 
from the forty less innovative states in the US, patent grant has a greater impact than for patents 
that originate from the top ten innovative states. This finding implies that, the publicity 
associated with the patent grant is more important in shaping the geographic reach of patent 
transfers when patents originate from less innovative states. 
Our paper relates closely to two streams of literature. The first is the market for patens. 
This topic was first studied in the economic history literature. Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1999, 
2001) investigated how the patent system contributed to the development of a formal market of 
trading intangible assets in the US during the 19
th
 century. Burhop and Wolf (2013) examined 
the market of patents in Germany between 1884 and 1913 and focused primarily on the 
geographic determinants of patent assignments.
3
 While this literature has been concerned with 
                                                             
3See Burhop and Wolf (2013) and the references therein for more references concerning the market of patents in a 
historical context. 
4 
 
the geographic aspect of patent transactions, it has not examined the role of patent grants. 
Serrano (2010) was the first to use modern day data from USPTO to analyze the determinants of 
patent trades and focused on the gains from such trades. 
The second stream examines the impact of patent grant on licensing. Two recent studies 
by Elfenbein (2007) and Gans et al (2008) concluded that patent grant increases the hazard rate 
of licensing.
4
 However, they did not offer any insights on the geography of the licensing activity 
and whether this is influenced by the event of patent grant. The only study which examines the 
impact of patents on the geography of innovative activity is by Moser (2011) which found that an 
exogenous shift towards patenting chemical inventions enhanced the geographic diffusion of 
such innovations. However, she did not explicitly examine the market for patents. 
We contribute to the aforementioned literature by examining the role of patent grant in 
the geography for the market of ideas. Geography is one of the most important obstacles of 
accessing other regions‟ R&D (Keller 2002). Therefore, examining whether patents alleviate part 
of the geographic boundaries in the market of ideas can play a role in our understanding of how 
patents moderate the role of geography.  
The next Section describes the data and the empirical setup. In Section 3 we present the 
results and in Section 4 the paper concludes. Technical details of the coarsened exacting 
matching are included in Appendix I. 
 
2. Data Description and Empirical Setup 
2.1 Data Construction 
Data on patent trades have graciously been supplied to us by the Office of Chief 
Economist at the USPTO.
5
 The Office has compiled a dataset which discloses patent assignments 
(transactions) between entities which are registered at the USPTO.
6
 This dataset is called “Patent 
Assignment Dataset”. A typical assignment is characterized by a unique identifier (i.e. reel 
frame), the names of the buyer (i.e. assignee) and seller (i.e. assignor), the date that the 
transaction agreement was signed (execution date) and the patent numbers or patent applications 
                                                             
4This finding has also been supported by the theoretical literature (Hellman 2007; Hellman and Perotti 2011). 
5 As of recently, the data are publicly available at Google bulk 
downloads:http://www.google.com/googlebooks/uspto-patents-assignments.html 
6 In the US, when entities transfer US issued patents to other entities, they disclose such transactions to the USPTO. 
The latter are called assignments. 
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that are traded per assignment. For detailed information on the dataset see Graham and Marco 
(2014).   
While compiling our sample we faced two main challenges. The first one relates to the 
fact that entities are not required to report transactions to the USPTO. Hence, it is likely that a 
number of transactions have not been disclosed to the USPTO either due to negligence, or to 
strategic behavior of firms. Nevertheless, for legal and perhaps accounting reasons, they have 
incentives to do so.
7
 However, given the question in our paper, as long as this missing 
information is random for patents sold before (during application) and after grant, it is not likely 
to bias our results.  
The second challenge is associated with excluding “routine” transactions. In the US, only 
an individual can file for a patent application. Subsequently, this individual may re-assign the 
patent to the firm or institution where he/she is employed. Such “routine” transactions are also 
included in the dataset. However, in our case we only consider transactions between firms and 
we exclude transactions that involve persons; hence we have not included such transactions in 
our sample. 
The concluding sample includes 25,127 patents granted between 1990 and 2003 which 
have been traded among US located firms for the period 1986 to 2010 and for which location 
information for both the assignee (buyer) and the assignor (seller) was available. Since our 
objective is to examine the effect of patent grant on the probability of the patented invention to 
be sold outside the state of the seller, we distinguish between two groups of patents. The first 
group is composed by patent applications that have been sold during the application phase. We 
refer to these patent applications also as “patents” throughout the text, as they are eventually 
patented. We call this group of patents “group BEFORE”, referring to the fact that they have 
been sold before patent grant. The second group includes patents that have been sold after patent 
grant. We name this group “group AFTER”. 
 Further, for each patent we collected the number of citations they receive from 
subsequent patents through 2010. This type of citations is called forward patent citations. We 
obtained this information from Lai et al (2010). We collected information regarding the primary 
US classification of each patent from the NBER data project. Since the latter dataset has the 
                                                             
7 For instance, in a potential litigation the courts will need to know clearly which firm or organization holds the 
intellectual property in question. Thus, parties that are involved in such transactions have incentives to disclose such 
information to the USPTO. 
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population of patents and location information for each patent owner, we are able to compute the 
number of patents each state produces each year and the fraction of patents in each technology 
field.  
 
2.2. Coarsened Exact Matching Procedure 
Patent length by and large cannot be influenced by firms
8
 (Regibaeu and Rockette 2010). 
Therefore, from the firms‟ viewpoint the exact timing of patent grant is exogenous. However, 
because it takes considerable time for a patent to be issued since its application date,
9
 patent 
grant could just be picking up an age effect of the patented invention. In other words, the longer 
the time period is since the inception of the patented invention, the longer it takes for firms to 
become aware of the invention. Hence, the patent grant could be confounded with the age of the 
patented invention which could be the sole driver of a patent being sold further away.  
To tackle this endogeneity problem, we match the patented inventions in group AFTER 
with the patented inventions in group BEFORE, based on the lag between the sale date and the 
application date; we denote this lag as LAG. We implement the Coarsened Exact Matching 
(CEM) procedure by Iacus et al (2008). By matching the AFTER group with the BEFORE group 
based on this lag, we avoid the endogeneity issue of the patent grant being correlated with the 
age of the patented invention.  
The distribution of LAG is displayed in Figure 1. As can be seen, most of the patented 
inventions are sold soon after application, a finding consistent with Serrano (2010) and with 
results from the licensing literature (Elfenbein 2007). Of note is also the lag of sale date from 
grant date, which is presented in Figure 2.  The highest likelihood of a patent being sold occurs 
within a few years before or after grant.  
From the above findings we conclude that in order to have a comprehensive match of 
AFTER patents with BEFORE patents based on LAG, we should  consider only patents that were 
sold within a few years from application date and have an application length of similar or less 
than that amount of years. Initially, we chose LAG≤6 and ApplicationLength≤6. This reduces our 
                                                             
8In other jurisdictions, firms can significantly influence patent length via deferral examinations. However, this 
scheme does not exist in the USPTO. 
9 In this sample the average application length is 2.37 years. 
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sample to 17,780 observations.
10,11 
Nonetheless, for robustness, in later specifications i) we also 
exclude patents sold within one year since the application date, ii) we add patents that were sold 
within 7 years from the application date and have an application length of less than or equal to 7 
years, iii) or only consider patents that were sold within 5 years from the application date and 
have an application length of less than or equal to 5 years in later specifications. 
In addition to the LAG variable, we match patents based on two more key variables: the 
citations that the patent receives through 2010 and the share that the seller‟s state has in the 
particular technology field.
12
 The first variable (CITES) accounts for the quality/importance of 
the patent (Harhoff et al. 1999, Hall et al. 2005). Higher quality patents may become known 
faster and, therefore, the probability of being sold outside state borders could be higher. The 
second variable (SHARE) accounts for the seller‟s state innovative activity in the particular field. 
This way, we control for state bias where technologies that are close to the state‟s technology 
portfolio are more likely to be sold within the state regardless of whether they belong in group 
BEFORE or AFTER. We then coarsen the joint distribution of these three variables into strata 
and match BEFORE with AFTER patents. Appendix I describes in detail the coarsened matching 
procedure.  
 
2.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for each group of patents. More specifically, Panel 
A displays the summary statistics for the two groups prior to the matching procedure, while 
Panel B post the matching procedure. Note that SameState equals to 1 if a patent is sold within 
the seller‟s state and equals to zero if it is sold outside the seller‟s state. In Panel A (raw data), 
AFTER patents are four percent less likely to be sold within the state and they take on average 
2.3 years more to get sold. Therefore, as was initially postulated, AFTER patents could indeed be 
                                                             
10This way, we also avoid a right censoring problem for patents that are granted in 2003 as they would only have 8 
years to be sold after grant.  
11 354 patents were excluded because their application length was larger than 6 years. The additional 6,993 patents 
were rejected as their LAG was larger than 6 years. This implies that 17,780/25,127 = 70.1% of patents are licensed 
within 6 years. 
12 We define the technology field in the following way; we obtain the primary US classification of each patent from 
the NBER patent data project (https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/). Based on Hall et al. (2001) and the 
NBER update, where they categorize each classification in 37 technology fields, we accordingly assign each patent 
to one of the 37 technology fields. 
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sold outside state borders due to an aging effect. Moreover, AFTER patents have 1.4 CITES 
more on average. 
Panel B shows the summary statistics of the coarsened groups. First of all, the matching 
rate for group AFTER is 88% (6,499/7,385), while for group BEFORE is 97.7% (10,158/10,395). 
Second, a patent in group AFTER is 9% more likely to be sold outside a state than a patent in 
group BEFORE. However, unlike Panel A, patents on average now have similar LAG, CITES 
and SHARE. This is in sharp contrast with the results in Panel A, where the difference in the 
likelihood of a patent being sold within the state could be attributed to an aging effect. Figure 3 
illustrates the probability of a patent sold within the state in relation to the time it takes to be sold 
since the application date (i.e. LAG). Regardless the time it takes for a patent to be sold, patents 
sold after grant have lower probability to be sold within the state than patents with similar LAG 
which are sold before grant. 
 
2.4. Empirical Implementation 
For the coarsened sample, we estimate the following regression: 
 
SameStatei = α0 + g1AfterGranti + AppYearDummy + TechnologyDummy (1) 
 
As before, SameState takes value 1 if patent i is sold within the state and 0 if it is sold 
outside the state. AfterGrant is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if patent   is sold after 
grant and 0 otherwise. In other words if patent i belongs to the AFTER group, then AfterGranti=1 
and if it belongs to the BEFORE then AfterGranti=0. AppYearDummy is a group of dummies that 
cover the application year (overall nineteen dummies) and TechnologyDummy is a set of dummy 
variables representing the thirty seven technology fields (overall thirty six dummies), as defined 
by Hall et al (2001) based on the primary US Classification. 
We estimate (1) using OLS. While the dependent variable (SameState) is binary, we opt 
for a linear estimation due to the number of dummy variables. Results from a probit model yield 
qualitatively similar estimates. 
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3. Results 
Table 2 displays the results of the effect of a grant on patent to be sold within the state. 
Column 1 considers the baseline model which includes patents that were sold within 6 years 
from application date and have an application length of less than or equal to 6 years. AFTER 
patents are 9% less likely to be sold inside the state compared to BEFORE patents. This finding 
implies that issued patents can stretch the geographic reach of the market for ideas. To check the 
sensitivity of our results, in Column 2 we only consider patents that were sold within 5 years and 
have an application length of less than or equal to 5 years. This reduces the sample to 15,360 
patents. The matching rate for patents in group BEFORE is 97.7% (9,9916/10,153) and for 
patents in group AFTER 92.6% (5,444/5,881). Results are very similar to Column 1. Next, we 
consider the baseline sample of Column 1 and add patents that were sold within 7 years from 
application date and have an application length within 6 and 7 years. This increases our baseline 
sample to 18,573 observations and the matching rates for BEFORE patents and AFTER patents 
are 97.8% (10,307/10,544) and 94.8% (8,266/8,720) respectively. Column 3 displays these 
results which are similar to those previously mentioned.  
As a last robustness check, we consider the baseline sample but exclude patents sold 
within one year since the application date in Column 4. We consider this specification, as many 
patents could be transferred immediately to the parent firms or alternatively to the subsidiary 
firms. This reduces the sample to 12,459 patents and the matching rate for BEFORE patents is 
99.7% (5,942/5,962) while for AFTER patents is 88.6% (6,517/7,354). Results are in agreement 
with those presented before. Since our findings are overall qualitatively similar and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, for the remainder we consider patents that were sold within 6 years 
from the application date and have an application length of less than or equal to 6 years. 
Next, in Table 3 we examine whether the role of patent grant varies across technology 
fields. We classify each patent to a broad technology field per Hall et al. (2001): Chemical, 
Computer, Drug, Electronics, Mechanical and Other. In each case we first consider each group 
of patents by their respective technology fields and perform the coarsened exact matching for 
each technology group separately. Thus, the sample in each procedure was reduced substantially 
and therefore the matching rate was not satisfactory in certain cases.  
Column 1 of Table 3 presents the results for the Chemical patents. The matching rate for 
group BEFORE is 94.1% (950/1,1010) and for group AFTER 73.3% (887/1,210). While the 
10 
 
coefficient of AfterGrant is not significant, in absolute size, it is similar as the one in Column 1 
of Table 2. This implies that patent grant has almost the same influence in the Chemical patents 
as in the population of patents.  
Column 2 shows the influence of patent grant in Computer patents. The matching rate for 
BEFORE patents is 90.2% (1,432/1,588) and for AFTER patents 72.3% (965/1,334). Here the 
coefficient is both close to zero and insignificant. In Column 3, for Drug patents the matching 
rate is disappointing; for BEFORE patents it is 87.4% (789/903) and for AFTER patents 60.5% 
(649/1,073). Therefore, for this case results should be interpreted cautiously. While the 
coefficient is approximately half the size from the baseline specification, it is significant at the 
10% level. Further, Columns 4-6 exhibit the results for the Electronics, Mechanical and Other 
patents respectively. Results are similar to the overall population with the coefficient of AFTER 
being negative and significant.
13
  
Overall, results show that patent grant increases the geographic reach of a sale regardless 
of the technology field. The weakest results are obtained in the cases of Computers and Drug. 
While results should be interpreted cautiously, these findings could imply that for these 
technology fields patent grant may have a smaller impact. Reasons may be that there is a higher 
concentration in these fields across space for these technologies (Drivas and Economidou 2014), 
therefore the majority of potential buyers are concentrated in few geographic clusters, and the 
fact that there may be additional channels though which these types of inventions are diffused 
across space. This latter reason can decrease the significance of the role of patent grant as a 
medium of knowledge diffusion. 
Our most interesting results are found when we examine whether patent grant plays a 
differential role in case a patent originates from one of the top 10 innovative states or from a less 
innovative state. As top 10 innovative states, we consider the states that consistently over the 
years have spent the most considerable amounts in R&D based on the Science and Engineering 
State Profiles of the National Science Foundation
14
. These 10 states are CA, IL, MA, MD, MI, 
                                                             
13 We should not however that the matching rate for the AFTER patents is disappointing in all three sets. 
Specifically, for Electronics, the rate for BEFORE patents is 95.9% (896/934) and for AFTER patents 64.7% 
(797/1,232). Mechanical BEFORE patents have matching rate of 83.9% (566/675) and AFTER patents 57.8% 
(632/1,093). Finally, for the category Other BEFORE patents have a matching rate of 93.8% (799/852) and AFTER 
patents a rate of 67.6% (955/1412). 
14 http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/states/ 
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NJ, NY, PA, TX and WA.
15
 Column 1 of Table 4 considers patents originating from the least 
innovative states. Overall, of 13,316 patents, 45.2% (6,018) originate from these states. The 
matching rate for BEFORE patents is 96.8% (2,693/2,783) while for AFTER patents is 81.1% 
(2,625/3,235). The coefficient shows that patent grant decreases the probability of a patent to be 
sold within the state by 10.6%; the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Column 2 considers 
patents that originate from the top 10 innovative states. The matching rate for BEFORE patents is 
99.8% (3,172/3,179) while for AFTER patents is 83.4% (3,434/4,119). The coefficient 
demonstrates that patent grant reduces the likelihood of the patent being sold within the state by 
5%. Moreover, the coefficient is significant at just the ten percent significance level. This 
comparison starkly shows that patent grant plays a greater role in the geographic reach of the 
market for ideas for patents originating from less innovative states than for patents originating 
from the top ten innovative states. Corporations located in the top innovative states are likely to 
have ties/connections both with the local business environment and with out-of-state 
corporations. Hence, the patent grant is not as important as in the case of patents originating from 
the least innovative states. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper examines whether patents stretch the geographic reach of the market for ideas. 
Our setting is patent transfers between US located firms. We examine whether patents sold 
during application phase are less likely to be sold outside the seller‟s state than patents that are 
sold after they are issued. In other words, we examine the effect of the patent grant on the 
probability that the patent will be sold outside the seller‟s state. Our dataset consists of 25,127 
patents granted between 1990 and 2003 and traded among US located firms during the period 
1986-2010. Patent grant, however, maybe conflated with merely a timing element; patented 
inventions may be known for a longer time period and therefore more likely to be sold further 
way than inventions during the application phase. To deal with this endogeneity problem, we use 
coarsened exact matching techniques based on the time they take to be sold; in addition we 
match patents based on quality and state macroeconomic elements. 
                                                             
15 CA stands for California; IL for Illinois; MA for Massachusetts; MD for Maryland; MI for Michigan; NJ for New 
Jersey; NY for New York; PA for Pennsylvania; TX for Texas; WA for Washington. 
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We find that issued patents that display similar characteristics are more likely to be sold 
outside the state‟s boarders, compared to patent applications. This finding indicates that patents 
play a role in mitigating the geographic distance in the market for ideas. The result is robust to 
different “cuts” of the data. This result holds across technology fields though it is weaker for 
Computers and Drug patents. A number of reasons may apply but results should be interpreted 
cautiously as the matching rates are not satisfactory. Our final important finding is that the 
aforementioned effect is stronger for patents originating from less innovative states than from top 
innovative states. Hence, patents may be more necessary to firms that are not located within 
innovative clusters to stretch the geographic reach of the market for ideas. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of original and matched samples. Distinguish between BEFORE and 
AFTER groups.  
 Panel A: Prior Matching Panel B: Matched Patents 
 
group 
BEFORE 
(N=10,395) 
group  
AFTER  
(N=7,385) 
group  
BEFORE 
(N=10,158) 
group  
AFTER  
 (N=6,499) 
SameState 0.44 0.4 0.50 0.41 
 
(0.5) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) 
Lag 1.35 3.72 3.43 3.48 
 
(0.96) (1.28) (1.16) (1.16) 
Cites 11.9 13.3 13.07 13.25 
 
(22.2) (22.8) (22.25) (23.11) 
Share 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 2. Effect of patent grant on trade within state  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Baseline 
(Patents sold 
within 6 years 
from Application 
Date) 
Patents sold within 
5 years from 
Application Date 
Baseline + Patents 
sold within 7 years 
from Application 
Date 
Baseline without 
Patents sold within 
1
st
 year since 
Application Date 
  
    AFTER -0.0919*** -0.0963*** -0.105*** -0.110*** 
 
(0.0280) (0.0201) (0.0265) (0.0278) 
cons 0.511** -0.0425 0.407*** 0.473** 
 
(0.217) (0.0331) (0.0512) (0.206) 
     Observations 16,657 15,360 18,573 12,459 
R-squared 0.492 0.511 0.490 0.483 
Notes: Regressions are estimated via Ordinary Least Squares and they report heteroskedastic robust standard errors 
(in parentheses). All regressions include application year dummies and technology field dummies. Significance 
level: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
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Table 3. Effect of patent grant on trade within state across technology fields  
VARIABLES  
(1)  
Chemicals 
(2)  
Computers 
(3)  
Drug 
(4)  
Electronics 
(5)  
Mechanics 
(6)  
Others 
       
AFTER  -0.0741 -0.0366 -0.0473* -0.155** -0.150** -0.124** 
 (0.0445) (0.0237) (0.0194) (0.0473) (0.0465) (0.0535) 
Cons  0.166** 0.976*** 0.475*** -0.0177 0.112* 0.165*** 
 (0.0595) (0.00861) (0.0108) (0.118) (0.0534) 0.0215) 
       
Observations  1,837 2,397 1,438 1,693 1,198 1,754 
R-Squared  0.442 0.441 0.495 0.499 0.544 0.550 
Notes: Regressions are estimated via Ordinary Least Squares and they report heteroskedastic robust standard errors 
(in parentheses). All regressions include application year dummies and technology field dummies. Significance 
level: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
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Table 4. Effect of patent grant on trade within state. Distinguish between top innovative and less 
innovative states. 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Less Innovative States Top Innovative States 
  
  AFTER -0.106*** -0.0503* 
 
(0.0346) (0.0284) 
cons 1.216*** -0.101 
 
(0.0327) (0.133) 
   Observations 5,318 6,606 
R-squared 0.506 0.498 
Notes: Regressions are estimated via Ordinary Least Squares and they report heteroskedastic robust standard errors 
(in parentheses). All regressions include application year dummies and technology field dummies. Significance 
level: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of lag from application date to sale date  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of lag from grant date to sale date  
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Figure 3. Probability of a patent sold within the state in relation to the LAG  
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Appendix I 
As the objective is to estimate the effect of patent grant on the probability of a patent to 
be traded outside the state, we need to address a key endogeneity issue; i.e. patent grant could be 
correlated with other factors that influence the reach of the trade but cannot be attributed to 
patent grant itself. As patent grant takes on average years after application date, patented 
inventions could be traded further away simply because they are known for a longer time and 
therefore the probability to be traded outside the state increases.  
Thus, the first and most important task is to match AFTER patents with BEFORE patents 
based on the time they take to be sold since application date (denote this lag as LAG).  
However, we are also interested in matching patents based on quality. Higher quality 
patents may be traded further away, as they are more likely to be known by more firms. To proxy 
for quality we use the variable CITES, which is the number of citations the patent has received 
until 2010.  
Lastly, it is important to also match patents based on the state‟s patent profile. For 
instance, patents in technology field X are more likely to be sold within a state if the state‟s 
concentration of patents in technology field X is high. To proxy for this, we use the variable 
SHARE, which is defined as the share a state has in the technology field of the focal patent. Of 
17,780 patents, 7,385 belong in the AFTER group and 10,395 in the BEFORE group. To identify 
control patents for the AFTER patents, we take into account three covariates: 
 
1) LAG 
2) CITES 
3) SHARE 
 
Our main concern is the BEFORE patents to be matched to the AFTER patents based on 
the LAG. Therefore, the distribution of LAG is coarsened into six month intervals (except the 
first year), i.e. 11 strata. With respect to CITES, the distribution is coarsened into four quartiles
16
. 
                                                             
16 A patent belongs in the first quartile if it has accumulated between 0 and 2 citations; in the second if it has 
accumulated between 3 and 6; in the third if it has accumulated between 7 and 14 and in the fourth if it has 
accumulated more than 14 citations. 
22 
 
The distribution of SHARE is coarsened into four quartiles as well.
17
 Next, we coarsen the joint 
distributions of these covariates by creating 176 strata (11x4x4 = 176).  
Finally we match the patents in the AFTER group with the patents in the BEFORE group 
based on the strata each patent belongs to. Given that this is a computationally intensive 
procedure we implement the routine by Iacus et al (2012)
18
. 
Finally, there are two issues worth noting. First, in any new sample specification that we 
may propose (e.g. we include patents sold within 6 to 7 years since application date or keeping 
only patents from a specific technology field) we repeat the above procedure. We may also 
include more strata in LAG and have different cutoff values for the quartiles of CITES and 
SHARE.  
Second, ideally we would like to match patents based on other determinants as well; for 
instance, based on the technology field. However, the number of strata would increase 
dramatically and therefore we would have a poor matching. This is the so-called “curse of 
dimensionality” where, while we could in theory match a number of dimensions, the matching 
between units in the one group with the units in the other group would be very poor.
19
 
Nonetheless, not all is lost since we still control for these variables in the regressions. 
 
 
 
                                                             
17 A patent belongs in the first quartile if its state has less than 2% of its patents in the same technological field (per 
Hall et al. 2001) as the patent, in the second quartile if its state has between 2% and 4%, in the third if its state has 
between 4% and 7.5% and in the fourth it has more than 7.5%. 
18 The coarsened exact matching routine can be found in the Stata .do file by Blackwell et al (2009). 
19 For a more detailed discussion consult Azoulay et al (2010). 
